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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
D O N W E I L E R B E N N I O N , Executor
of the Estate of Heber Bennion, Jr.,
V E R A W . B E N N I O N , and B E N NION RANCHING COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiffs-ll

espondents,

vs.
D U D L E Y M. AMOSS and D I A N A
M . A M O S S , his wife,
Defendants-Appellants,

Case No.
13551

DAGGETT COUNTY DEVELOPM E N T CORPORATION,
a corporation,
Applicant for Intervention
and Appellant.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
N A T U R E OF PROCEEDINGS
This was an action to foreclose a mortgage on real
property in Daggett County. Following Sheriff's sale,
the mortgagors moved the court for an order vacating
1
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the foreclosure sale. The assignee of the equity of
redemption moved to intervene and join in the motion
to vacate the sale.

DISPOSITION OF CASE
The trial court denied the motions.

R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L
Appellant seek reversal and remand to the District
Court with directions to permit Daggett County Development Corporation to intervene as a defendant,
to vacate the foreclosure sale, to enter judgment for
appellants for all amounts paid in excess of that required
to satisfy the mortgage indebtedness, and to satisfy
the judgment previously entered in favor of the Bennions and against the Amosses.

S T A T E M E N T OF FACTS
After a hearing at which both the Amosses and
the Bennions were present and represented, the court
on November 20, 1972, entered an Amended Decree
of Foreclosure in which it directed the sale of the mortgaged property. The Amosses were not served a copy
of the amnded decree or notified of its having been
entered, and they were not able to obtain a copy until
November 28, 1972 (Tr. 3). The sale was scheduled
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for December 15, 1972, and on December 13, the
Amosses moved the court for an order postponing the
sale, directing that the property be sold in parcels,
and apportioning water stock among the various parcels.
The motion was based on the ground that because
of the delay in the Amosses' receiving a copy of the
amended Decree of Foreclosure there was an unreasonably short time within which to interest potential
bidders in attending the sale; that the statute required
sale of the property in parcels and equitable apportionment of the water stock. The motion for postponement
was also based upon the ground that the Amosses had
obtained a financing commitment and would be able
to pay the mortgage indebtedness by December 27,
1972, within two weeks after the scheduled foreclosure
sale.
In order to prevent the postponement from injuring the Bennions, the Amosses stipulated that the sale
could be conducted on December 27, 1972, without
further notice or advertising, that the period of redemption might be reduced by the length of time equivalent
to the extension granted, and that the defendants would
pay interest at the rate of eight and one half (8%%)
percent on the judgment for the period of the extension, though the judgment itself provided for interest
only at the rate of five (5%) percent. After the court
denied the Amosses5 motion, they contacted the Bennions' counsel prior to the sale, showed him a copy of
the loan commitment, and assured him that the money
3
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to pay the debt would be available within a few days,
but he refused to consent to any postponement of the
sale.
The sale was held on December 15, 1972. Mr.
Amoss attended the sale and requested the sheriff to
sell the property in parcels but the request was denied
and the sheriff announced that the property would be
sold in one piece (Tr. 22) ; when the bidding commenced the Bennions bid an amount sufficient to pay
the mortgage indebtedness and costs of sale, whereupon
Mr. Amoss, in behalf of Daggett County Development
Corporation, offered a bid of $130,000. The Bennions'
counsel said, "Is that cash? The sheriff will not accept
anything but cash," and the sheriff refused to sell for
anything but the payment of the full purchase price
in cash at the time of the sale, though he stated that
he was doing this on his own and not because of the
instructions given to him by the Bennions' counsel.
The amount for which the property was sold was
$128,550, while the property was worth approximately
$1,000,000. The property was subsequently redeemed
by Daggett County Development Corporation ("DCDC"), assignee of the equity of redemption; but in
order to redeem the property it was required to pay
the Bennions $7,655.87 in excess of the mortgage debt,
costs and interest.
Following the sale the Amosses moved the court
for an order vacating the foreclosure sale. At the hearing on this motion the Bennions vigorously contested
4
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the Amosses' standing to obtain any relief inasmuch
as the equity of redemption had been assigned to Daggett County Development Corporation. The corporation
thereupon filed a motion for leave to intervene as a
defendant in order to file a motion in its own behalf
to vacate the foreclosure sale.
The court ruled that while some of the irregularities in the sale might have prejudiced the defendants,
the irregularities were waived by the redemption, and
the record did not disclose "sufficient ultimate facts"
to require vacation of the sale. The motion In vacate
and the motion to intervene were denied.

/"!'i I- XxUMENT
I
T H E T R I A L COURT A B U S E D ITS DISCRET I O N 1X R E F U S I N G TO v \ r \ T E
THE
F O R E C L O S I m E <* \ T , E .
Judicial mortgage and execution sales are intended
for the sole purpose of seeing that the underlying debt
is paid, and the sales must be conducted with fairness
and due regard to the rights of the judgment debtors.
The courts have not hesitated to vacate those foreclosure sales in which statutory procedures have not
been followed, in which the bidding has been chilled,
in which the sale has been for a grossly inadequate price,
or in which there have been other circumstances indicating harsh or unfair dealing with the property.
5
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The present case does not involve a single ground
for vacation of the Sheriff's sale, but an accumulation
of grounds, any one of which has been held to be sufficient to vacate such a sale: there was a refusal on the
part of the sheriff to sell the property in parcels; there
was chilled bidding; the sale was for a grossly inadequate price; and the sheriff placed unreasonable restrictions on the bidding by requiring DCDC, as bidder, to
pay the entire purchase price in cash at the moment
of sale.
Sale in Parcels
Mortgage foreclosure sales are governed by the
provisions of Title 78, Chapter 37, Utah Code Annotated 1953, and by Rule 69, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. With respect to mortgage foreclosures it is
provided in 78-37-1 UCA 1953:
" * * * Judgment shall be given adjudging the
amount due, with costs and disbursements, and
the sale of the mortgaged property or some part
thereof, to satisfy said amount and accruing costs,
and directing the sheriff to proceed and sell the
same according to the provisions of law relating
to sales on execution, and a special execution or
order of sale shall be issued for that purpose."
Rule 69 (e) (3), U R C P , provides in part:
"Conduct of sale. All sales of property under
execution must be made at auction to the highest
bidder, between the hours of 9:00 o'clock, a.m.
and 5:00 o'clock, P.M. After sufficient property
has been sold to satisfy the execution no more
shall be sold. * * * when the sale is of real prop6
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erty, consisting of several known lots or parcels,
they must be sold separately * * * . The judgment debtor, if present at the sale, may also
direct the order in which the property, real or
personal, shall be sold, when such property consists of several known lots or parcels, or of articles
which can be sold to advantage separately, and
the officer must follow such directions."
The Utah Statute, 78-37-6 Utah Code Annotated
1953, also directs that where shares of corporate stock
evidencing title to a water right used, or intended to
be used, or suitable for use, on the land is included in
the sale, the water stock is to be equitably apportioned
to the land, or some part thereof, in one or more parcels,
as may be suitable.
In Cole v. Canton Mining Company, 59 Utah 140,
202 P . 830 (1921), this court held that a mortgagor
had the right to demand sale by separate parcels. The
question was treated but not decided in 1951 in Commercial Bank of Utah v. Madsen, 120 Utah 519, 236
P.2d 434 (1951).
In Long v. Manning, 455 S.W.2d 496 (Mo.
1970), the Supreme Court of Missouri dealt with the
question of parceling property and concluded:
"There cannot be the slightest doubt that a
mortgage of real estate in this state is not conveyance of the legal title to the property. The
mortgagor remains the owner of the property,
and the mortgage only constitutes a lien thereon
for the satisfaction of the mortgage debt. It
logically follows, without the slightest impairment of the mortgage contract, that he is not

7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

entitled to a sale and probable sacrifice of the
whole mortgaged premises if the mortgage debt
can be satisfied in full by a sale of a part thereof.
All that he can justly require is that his debt
be paid out of the mortgaged property or as much
as may be necessary to fully satisfy his secured
obligation."
In some jurisdictions sale of the property as a
whole is void if sale by parcels would be appropriate,
though the general rule is that such a sale is voidable
at the instance of the mortgagor. 59 C.J.S., Mortgages,
§575.
That foreclosure sales may be set aside for failure
to ahdere to the procedural rules is supported by First
National Bank of Salt Lake City v. Haymond, 89 Utah
151,57 P.2d 1401 (1936), Cole v. Canton Mining Company, supra, and Commercial Bank of Utah v. Madsen,
supra. The effect of an improper execution of a rightful
foreclosure is discussed at 108 A.L.R. 594.
Inadequate Price
Inadequacy of price is an additional ground for
setting aside of foreclosure sale, particularly where
accompanied by other circumstances. In Cole v. Canton
Mining Company, 59 Utah 140, 202 p. 830 (1921), the
court held that there is a duty to acquire the highest
price possible for the property sold, although price
cannot be the determining factor in all cases. In First
National Bank of Salt Lake City v. Haymond, 89 U.
151, 57 P.2d 1401 (1936), the court stated that "substantial inadequacy of price, coupled with fraud, mis8
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take or other unfair dealing is sufficient to justify a
court of equity upon timely motion to set aside the sale
and order a resale."
The authority of courts to set aside foreclosure
sales for inadequacy of price, where coupled with other
circumstances, is well established. The cases that follow
are typical.
In Ballentyne v. Smith, 205 U.S. 285, 51 L.Ed
803, 27 S.Ct. 527 (1907), the United States Supreme
Court recognized the authority of trial courts to set
aside foreclosure sales where gross inadequacy of price
was coupled with other circumstances indicative of
fraud, irregularity, or unfairness.
Where land worth twenty-five times the debt wras
purchased for the amount of the indebtedness, the court
in Van Senden v. OyBrian, 58 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir.,
1932), said:
" . . . The inadequacy of the sale price was so
gross as to shock the conscience. Where this is
the case, the invariable practice has been, on
proper showing, to set the sale aside."
The reasoning behind the rule is well stated in
Raleigh and C. R. Company v. Baltimore National
Bank, 41 F.Supp. 599, 601 (E.D.S.C., 1941) :
"A judicial sale regularly made in the manner
prescribed by law upon due notice, and without
fraud, unfairness, surprise or mistake, will not
generally be set aside or refused confirmation
on account of mere inadequacy of price, however great, unless the inadequacy is so gross as

9
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to shock the conscience and raise a presumption
of fraud, unfairness or mistake. Whether the
price bid is grossly inadequate and whether and
upon what grounds confirmation should be refused are matters within the judgment and discretion of tribunal ordering the sale, with the
exercise of which an appellate tribunal will not
interfere except in cases of abuse . . . If the
inadequacy of price is so gross as to shock the
conscience, a Court of Equity would doubtless
seize upon other circumstances impeaching the
fairness of the transaction as a cause for vacating
it. (Citation omitted). But the circumstances impeaching the fairness of the transaction should
relate to the conduct of the officer making the
sale, or to the conduct of the purchaser participating, in the attempt to stifle competition, chill
the bidding or to take any other undue or unfair
advantage."
An inference at fraud in cases of gross inadequacy
of price was suggested by the court in Ellis v. Powell,
Mo. Sup., 117 S.W. 2d 225 (1938) :
"Inadequacy of consideration, if it be so gross
a nature as to amount in itself to conclusive and
decisive evidence of fraud, is a ground for cancelling a transaction. In such cases the relief is
granted, not on the ground of inadequacy of
consideration, but on the ground of fraud as evidenced thereby."
; Where $11,000.00 worth of real
at a foreclosure sale for $402.00 plus
consideration was considered grossly
such fact, when considered with some
the sale procedure warranted setting

estate was sold
$24.12 costs, the
inadequate, and
irregularities in
aside a sheriff's
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sale. Gaskill v. Neal, 77 Idaho 428, 293 P.2d 957
(1956). The Gaskll court concluded that:
"As a general rule, mere inadequacy of consideration is not sufficient ground for setting
aside a sheriff sale, but it is uniformly held
that gross inadequacy of consideration, coupled
with very slight additional circumstances, is sufficient." (Emphasis added.)
Justification for setting aside a foreclosure sale
is also found in unconscionable circumstances such as
mistake, fraud, collusion ,lack of good faith, unfairness
or inequitable results. The duty of a court of equity
to see that equity shall be done to all parties in a
mortgage foreclosure proceeding was set forth in First
National Bank of Salt Lake City v. Haymond, 89 U.
151, 57 P.2d 1401 (1936). The Utah Supreme Court
in that case recognized the elements of fraud, mistake
and unfair dealing as considerations to justify the
setting aside of a sale by a court of equity.
In Bank of American National Trust and Savings
Association v. Reidy et al, 15 Cal.2d 243, 101 P.2d 77,
80 (1940), the court said:
"It is the general rule that courts have power to
vacate foreclosure sale where there has been
fraud in the procurement of the foreclosure decree or where the sale has been improperly,
unfairly or unlawfully conducted, or is tainted
by fraud, or where there has been such a mistake
that to allow it to stand would be inequitable to
purchaser and parties. Sham bidding and the
restriction of competition are condemned, and
inadequacy of price when coupled with other

11
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circumstances of fraud may also constitute
grounds for setting aside the sale."
The element of "chilled bidding" was dealt with
by the United States Supreme Court in Geifert v.
National City Bank, 313 U.S. 221, 232, 61 S.Ct. 898,
L.Ed. 1299 (1941):
"And it is quite uniformally the rule in this
country . . . that while equity will not set aside
for mere inadequacy of price, it will do so if
the inadequacy is so great as to shock the conscience or if there are additional circumstances
against its fairness, such as chilled bidding."
As there is obviously an opportunity for oppression
in enforcement of a power of sale, courts scrutinize
its exercise in order to protect the mortgagor. Mills v.
Mutual Building and Loan Association, 216 N.C. 664,
6 S.E. 2d 549, 551 (1940). The judicial scrutiny is
accompanied by power to set aside unconscionable sales.
Handy v. Rodgers, 143 Colo. 1, 351 P.2d 819 (1960).
Payment in Cash
The sale was held on a Friday. Mr. Amoss attended,
bid $130,000.00 for the property in behalf of DCDC,
tendered a check for $13,000.00 (ten percent of the
bid price) as a deposit, and offered to pay the balance
by the following Monday or Tuesday, but the sheriff
demanded immediate payment of the entire $130,000.00
in cash.
There is limited case law on this problem, but what
there is supports Mr. Amoss's position that the sale was
improperly conducted. There was no warning of any
12
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strict cash terms in the Decree of Foreclosure, the Notice
of Sale, or the Amended Summary Judgment; and
there are no statutes or judicial rules requiring the
entire purchase price to be paid in cash at the time of
the sale. Indeed, Rule 69(e) (4), U R C P , seems to contemplate some delay in payment of the purchase price.
"In the absence of a statute or a provision in
the mortgage to the contrary, whether or not
the sale shall be for cash has been held to be
within the discretion of the court, and such discretionary power to sell partly on credit should
be exercised where the facts warrant such action
in view of the interests of all parties." 59 C.J.S.,
Mortgages, §732.
This reasoning has been followed consistently in
case law. In Prudential Insurance Company of America
v. Lemmons, 155 S.E. 591 (S.C., 1930), the Supreme
Court of South Carolina said:
"It is likewise beyond question that, in the absence of some statutory requirement, or some
provision of the mortgage contract to the contrary, the discretionary power of a court of equity
to order the sale of mortgaged premises for part
cash and part on time, the credit portion to be
secured by the note or bond and mortgage of
the purchaser, was recognized and has been uniformly sanctioned in this state from an early
period . . . and such seems to be the generally
recognized practice."
Citing the Lemmons case, the Supreme Court of
South Carolina held in Federal Bank of Columbia v.
Wells, 172 S.C. 1, 172 S.E. 707 (1934), that the court
had abused its discretion in requiring cash at the fore13
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closure sale. In doing so, the court pointed out that
each case would be governed by its own peculiar facts,
then proceeded to cite the "distressful times" and the
fact that the mortgagee was selling property on easy
terms.
In essence, then, the court held that the court
below had abused its discretion in disregarding the
imposition upon the defendants and the hardship to
them under existing conditions.
In Whitfield v. Riddle, 78 Ala. 99 (1884), the
Supreme Court upheld a credit sale upon foreclosure,
despite a provision in the mortgage requiring a cash
sale. The court said:
"It is further urged for appellants, that the
arrangement by which Winston Jones permitted
Tate and Morgan and purchase the Mitchell
lands on credit, was a fraud which should avoid
the foreclosure of the mortgage. Credit sales
usually command higher prices than those made
for cash. This would operate a benefit to the
mortgagor, and to all others interested in his
estate. There was nothing in the agreement calculated to forestall rival bidding, and it is not
shown the propery was sold below its market
value. There is nothing in this objection."
In the case of Horsey v. Hough, 38 Md. 130 (1873),
the mortgagee bid $1,600 at the foreclosure sale, while
another purchaser bid $2,375. The latter tendered
$1,200 in cash and stated that the balance would be
paid upon notification of the sale. The mortgagee declined to accept the money as not in conformity with
14
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the terms of the sale, the property having been advertised for sale, for cash. On appeal, the would-be purchaser excepted to the sale as unfair and fraudulent.
Upholding the position of the purchaser, the court
held:
"In determining upon the approval or rejection of the sale in such cases, the true question
to be considered, is not so much whether there
has been a literal or technical, as a fair and reasonable compliance with the terms of sale; and
a bona fide dispositon of the property.
"Without intending to charge the mortgagee,
in this case with the willful violation of his trust;
the circumstances disclosed by the proof, show
reasonable ground for the inference, that he
misapprehended the nature of his duty, as trustee,
which required an advantageous sale of the
property, for the benefit of all the parties interested."
In 59 C.J.S., Mortgages, Section 576, it is said:
« * * * w h e r e there is a manifest injustice in
refusing part credit, even though the terms of
the sale required cash, a subsequent sale for less
than could otherwise have been realized will not
be upheld."
In view of the sum of money involved, and the fact
that financing had already been arranged for, with
closing set a few days after the sale, the instant case
likewise involves elements of hardship to the defendants of the type which led the Wells court to find an
abuse of discretion.

15
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Even where the mortgage provided for a "cash
sale," this was held not to require one hundred percent
of the cash to be paid the day of the sale. This issue
is examined at length in the Missouri decision of Long
v. Manning, 455 S.W. 2d 496 (Mo., 1970). The
court there dealt with a situation in which the full consideration was not paid until six days after the foreclosure sale. No authority was cited holding that the
purchase price must be paid on the sale date. The court
said:
" * * * in Charles Green Real Estate Co. v. St.
Louis Mutual House Building Co., 196 Mo. 358,
93 S.W. 1111, it was held that payment made
fifteen days after the sale (a deposit having been
made at that time) was a substantial compliance
with the requirement of a sale for cash. W e find
nothing to the contrary. W e do find, however,
the case of Snyder v. Chicago, S.F. & C.R. Co.,
131 Mo. 568, 33 S.W. 67, in which payment to
the trustee was apparently not made by the purchaser for approximately two months after the
sale, after financing had been arranged and the
sale (on behalf of a school fund) had been approved by the county court. The plaintiff there
contended that the sale was not made for cash,
but upon a secret arrangement for credit. The
Court held that there was no abuse of authority
by the sheriff as trustee, that plaintiff's mortgage had been satisfied, and that everything was
fairly conducted. The contention that the sale
was not made for cash within the meaning of the
mortgage was denied. See also Webb et ux v.
Salisbury, 327 Mo. 1123, 39 S.W. 2d 1045."
The Long court concluded that the sale was a "cash"
16
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sale even though all of the consideration was not rendered on the sale date.
In Strother v. Law, 54 111. 413 (1970), where the
terms of the mortgage required a cash sale, the court
held that a delay of a few days in closing the transactions, by the making of the deed and payment of
the money, will not be regarded as the giving of a credit
to the purchaser.
The bid by Amoss was in the sum of $130,000,
thereby outbidding the plaintiffs by approximately
$2,000. Nevertheless, Amoss' bid was rejected on the
ground that he could not produce $130,000 on the spot.
As recognized by the above cited cases, such a requirement is unrealistic and inconsistent with the practices of
the financial world.
II
A P P E L L A N T S ' STANDING TO CONTEST
THE
FORECLOSURE
SALE
IS
NOT
B A R R E D BY T H E F A C T T H E P R O P E R T Y
WAS REDEEMED.
The defendants and their assigns were compelled
to exercise their statutory right to redeem from the foreclosure sale to avoid the risk of losing the property and
to protect their investment which was placed in jeopardy
by reason of the grossly inadequate purchase price at
the foreclosure sale. The redemption price paid by the
defendants and their assigns was therefore not a volunteer payment, and payments made under compul17
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sion do not bar the right of appeal. In 39 A.L.R. 2d
166, it is said:
"IT]he courts agree that payment following the
issuance of executon upon a judgment does not
cut off the payor's right to appeal . . . Under
this view the decisive factor is the coercive effect
of the issuance of execution . . . "
Burrows v. Stryker, 45 Iowa 700 (1877), held that
payment of a money judgment to prevent a sale of
property under execution is not voluntary and does
not affect the payor's right to appeal or maintain an
appeal from the judgment.
Where a judgment debtor, after disregarding
the sheriff's first notice requiring payment of the fieri
facias, was informed that if payment was not made by
a given hour, the sheriff would seize and sell defendants'
stock in trade, and the defendants paid to avert such
seizure and took immediate legal proceedings to stay
the fund in the sheriff's hands, it was held in Johnson
v. Clark, (1877) 29 La Ann 762, that the payment was
compulsory and hence did not bar the defendants from
maintaining a devolutive appeal.
And, in Levin v. Sarojf, 54 Cal. App. 285, 201 Pac.
961 (1921), the defendant to save his property from a
forced sale under execution, and on the assurance of
his attorney that he could recover his money in the event
of a reversal, satisfied the money judgment against him.
The Court of Appeals held that the payment was not
voluntary so as to prevent an appeal by him.
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In the present case, the payment was made to save
title to valuable property. It was compulsory and therefore does not bar the right to vacate the sale.

Ill
T H E C O U R T E R R E D I N R E F U S I N G TO
G R A N T T H E MOTION O F D A G G E T T COUNT Y D E V E L O P M E N T C O R P O R A T I O N TO
INTERVENE.
Intervention is governed by the provisions of Rule
24, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides in
part as follows:
"(a) Intervention of Right.
Upon timely
application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers
an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when
the representation of the applicant's interest by
existing parties is or may be inadequate and
the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment
in the action; or (3) when the applicant is so
situated as to be adversely affected by distribution or other disposition of property which is
in the custody or subject to the control or disposition of the court or an officer thereof.
(b) Permissive Intervention.
Upon timely
application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers
a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when
an applicant's claim or defense in the main action
have a question of law or fact in common. * * *
in exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delav
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or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of
the original parties."
The applicant does not contend that a statute gives
it any right to intervene in this case, but does contend
that it comes within the other two subsections of Rule
24(a) for the following reasons:
Although the present defendants have an interest
similar to that of the applicant, their representation
"is or may be inadequate'1 because of the fact that prior
to filing of their motion to vacate the foreclosure sale
they had assigned the equity of redemption to the
applicant. Thus, while the desire of the defendants to
adequately represent the applicant's position and their
legal ability to do so is not questioned, the representation is not adequate if the mortgagors are barred because
of their assignment of the equity of redemption. As
successor in interest to the equity of redemption, the
applicant had a right to come into court and protect
its interest in the property and in the foreclosure proceedings.
Additionally, the applicant is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition
of property which is subject to the control or disposition of the court. The motion to vacate the foreclosure
sale raises a practical issue of whether the defendants
and the applicant, or either of them, are entitled to the
return of approximately $7,600.00 representing the
"penalty" charged for redemption from foreclosure
sale.
20
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Inasmuch as the applicant's situation is within the
provisions of Rule 24(a), the only remaining question
is whether the application is "timely," and that depends
upon the posture of the case at the time the motion is
made. As stated in 3B Moore's Federal Practice, (2d
Ed.) Paragraph 24.13:
"Subdivisions (a) and (b) both require that
the application to intervene be 'timely.' 'This
question of timeliness cannot be split off and
considered in vacuo - as one separate and apart
from the question of the paragraph of Rule 24
under which intervention is sought.' Since the
basis for the permissive right to intervene is
largely one of trial convenience a court might
properly deny a motion to intervene unless made
at a very early stage, before substantial litigation of the issues has commenced, since it is
required by subdivision (b) to 'consider whether
the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice
the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties.' On the other hand the basis for intervention as of right is chiefly the fact that the
court's processes are apt to injure or prejudice
the applicant unless he is permitted to intervene.
#

#

#

*

Whether an application for intervention is
timely does not depend solely upon the amount of
time that may have elapsed since the institution
of the action, although of course that is a relevant consideration. Intervention has been allowed
several years after commencement of a suit,
where the substantial litigation of the issues have
not commenced when the motion to intervene
was tiled. * * *
Timeliness is a matter within the sound dis21
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cretion of the trial court, whether the intervention is allowed, or denied, and the court's decision is subject to reversal where discretion has
been abused.
Timeliness of permissive intervention should
be measured relative to the time when the applicant served the motion to intervene, not when
the motion is granted and intervenors are made
parties.
Intervention after judgment is unusual and
not often granted. It may be allowed, however,
where it is the only way to protect the intervenors rights; e.g., where the intervenor would
be bound by the judgment and the party purporting to represent him fails to appeal, or where
the intervenor is a member of a class in whose
behalf an action was originally filed, or where,
after the initial judgment, substantial questions
are left in the shaping of a decree. The trial
court may not allow intervention after an appeal
has been taken, except in aid of the appeal. In
an unusual case the appellate court may itself
allow intervention."
It is conceded that if the applicant had sought to
intervene in this case in connection with any matters
relating to the right to foreclose, or to the form and
shape of the decree of foreclosure, the application would
not be timely and should be denied. But here the application to intervene relates only to post-decree relief
that the law allows the trial court to grant, inasmuch
as a motion made to the court which supervised the
mortgage foreclosure sale is regarded as the usual way
of attacking the validity of the sale.
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With respect to that issue, there had been no
judgment in this case, and permitting the intervention
would not have required the retaking of testimony or
evidence. The evidence was in and the intervenor was
willing to stand on the evidence as made, since the
exhibits presented to the court at the hearing on the
motion to vacate the foreclosure sale establish the assignment of an interest to the applicant. Thus the application was timely under the provisions of Rule 24 and
it would not have unduly delayed or prejudiced the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties under
Rule 24(b).
The rule of permissive intervention is aimed at
judicial economy. In the present case the applicant's
motion and the motion filed by the defendant-mortgagors have questions of law and fact in common. In
fact the questions of fact are identical, and the questions
of law differ only with relation to the standing to vacate
the foreclosure sale. By permitting the applicant to
intervene in this action the court would have been able
to resolve all of the issues between the parties in this
one proceeding and avoided forcing the parties to bring
a separate action based upon the wrongful foreclosure
sale.
CONCLUSION
The court erred in refusing to grant defendant's
motion to vacate the sale and the motion of Daggett
County Development Corporation to intervene.
23
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As a result of the court's refusal to vacate the foreclosure sale which disposed of the property at a grossly
inadequate price, it became essential to redeem to protect the defendants' investment. The defendants cannot,
therefore, be held to have waived the right to challenge
the sale in a case where they were compelled to redeem.
The errors which occurred in the process of the
sale are too substantial to be passed over lightly. There
is nothing in the record to indicate that the property
could not have been sold in parcels. The requirement
by the sheriff that the defendants produce the full bid
price on the day of the sale was wholly unreasonable.
On these and other bases hereinabove set forth,
the decision in the court below should be reversed.
Bryce E. Roe
ROE AND F O W L E R
340 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellants
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